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Adaptive Polling in Hierarchical Social Networks
using Blackwell Dominance
Sujay Bhatt and Vikram Krishnamurthy, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Consider a population of individuals that observe an
underlying state of nature that evolves over time. The population
is classified into different levels depending on the hierarchical
influence that dictates how the individuals at each level form an
opinion on the state. The population is sampled sequentially by
a pollster and the nodes (or individuals) respond to the questions
asked by the pollster. This paper considers the following problem–
How should the pollster poll the hierarchical social network to
estimate the state while minimizing the polling cost (measurement
cost and uncertainty in the Bayesian state estimate)?
This paper proposes adaptive versions of the following polling
methods –Intent Polling, Expectation Polling, and the recently
proposed Neighbourhood Expectation Polling – to account for
the time varying state of nature and the hierarchical influence in
social networks. The adaptive polling problem in a hierarchical
social network is formulated as a partially observed Markov
decision process (POMDP). Our main results exploit the structure
of the polling problem, and determine novel conditions for
Blackwell dominance to construct myopic policies that provably
upper bound the optimal policy of the adaptive polling POMDP.
The LeCam deficiency is used to determine approximate Black-
well dominance for general polling problems. These Blackwell
dominance conditions also facilitate the comparison of Rényi
Divergence and Shannon capacity of more general channel
structures that arise in hierarchical social networks. Numerical
examples are provided to illustrate the adaptive polling policies
with parameters estimated from YouTube data.
Index Terms—Adaptive polling, POMDP, structural result,
Blackwell dominance, myopic policy, intent polling, expectation
polling, Shannon capacity
I. INTRODUCTION
Blackwell dominance and LeCam deficiency are widely
used in statistical analysis of estimators [1], [2], in char-
acterizing correlated and Nash equilibria in games [3], and
in stochastic control [4], [5]. Blackwell dominance also has
deeper information theoretic interpretations [6]. In this paper,
we use Blackwell dominance to construct efficient polling
strategies for hierarchical social networks. The Blackwell
dominance conditions we construct for adaptive polling also
have simple information theoretic interpretations in terms of
capacities of more general channel structures.
Polling has numerous applications such as predicting the
outcome of an election, estimating the fraction of supporters of
a particular party or fraction that believe in climate change, and
predicting the success of a particular product. However, the
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existing polling methods do not consider the effect of influence
that is inherently present in social networks. Many social
networks have a hierarchical structure; see for example [7]–
[11]. This hierarchical structure specifies the influence exerted
by the higher levels on the lower levels. This influence alters
the opinions of the lower level nodes and hence affects the
prediction or the poll estimate.
This paper takes the hierarchical structure into account to
devise adaptive (feedback control based) polling strategies in
a hierarchical social network to minimize the polling cost
(measurement cost and uncertainty in the Bayesian state esti-
mate). We call such feedback control based polling as Adaptive
Polling; see Fig.1. The adaptive polling problem is formulated
as a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP).
POMDPs provide a principled mathematical framework to
deal with sequential decision making problems with feedback
control in partially observed domains. The actions taken by
the pollster can influence the underlying state, noisy state-
observations or both. The goal of the pollster is to choose an
action, based on the history of past actions and observations,
that minimizes the expected costs incurred over time.
A. Context. Blackwell Dominance
In general, POMDPs are computationally intractable1 to
solve [13]. The main contribution of this paper is to exploit
the structure of the social influence network to construct
computationally efficient myopic policies that provably upper
bound the optimal polling policy. Construction of such myopic
bounds involves using the concept of Blackwell dominance of
the observation likelihoods.
Since the main results of the paper rely on Blackwell
dominance, for convenience, we now define Blackwell dom-
inance and its important information theoretic consequences.
Blackwell dominance formalizes the notion of which distribu-
tion (stochastic matrix) is more informative than the other.
A stochastic2 matrix B(1) ∈ P(Y(1)|X ) Blackwell domi-
nates [5], [14] another stochastic matrix B(2) ∈ P(Y(2)|X )
written as B(1) B B(2) (or B(1) is more informative than
B(2)), if
B(2) = B(1)R, for any stochastic matrix R. (1)
Blackwell dominance also has an information theoretic
consequence: Consider the textbook Discrete Memoryless
1They are PSPACE hard requiring exponential computational cost (in
sample path length) and memory [5], [12].
2A X × Y matrix B is (row) stochastic if
∑
j Bij = 1 for all i ∈ X ,
j ∈ Y , and Bij ∈ [0, 1].
2Channel (DMC) [15] with input alphabet X and output al-
phabet Y denoted as P(Y|X ). Let I(X ;Y) denote the mutual
information of the DMC. The post-processing of channel B(1)
in (1) is written as X → Y(1) → Y(2). Then from Data
Processing Inequality [15], it follows that
B(1) B B(2)⇒ I(X ;Y
(1)) ≥ I(X ;Y(2)). (2)
Theorem 1 below provides a relation between Blackwell
Dominance and Shannon capacity.
Theorem 1 ( [6], [16], [17]). For any two conditional distri-
butions B(1) ∈ P(Y(1)|X ) and B(2) ∈ P(Y(2)|X ),
B(1) B B(2)⇒ C
(1) ≥ C(2), (3)
where the Shannon capacity C(i) of a DMC is defined as
C(i) = sup
pX (x)
I(X ;Y(i)), i = 1, 2. (4)
Here pX (x) is the marginal distribution over the input alpha-
bet X .
In this paper, we will characterize the capacity for more
general channel structures that arise in polling hierarchical
social networks. Also, Blackwell dominance is used to order
the Rényi Divergence [15] of the observation likelihoods
of these channels. These information theoretic consequences
provide a ranking of these general channel structures in the
order of their ability to distinguish the states.
B. Main Results and Organization
(i) In Sec.II, the underlying state is modeled as a Markov
chain and the adaptive polling problem is formulated as a
POMDP. Open loop polling, where polling at a particular in-
stant is not influenced by the information previously collected,
is ineffective when the states evolve over time. In comparison,
the proposed adaptive (feedback) polling procedure utilizes
information previously collected to poll at the next instant.
In a hierarchical social network, the nodes at higher levels
in the hierarchy are more influential and so provide more
accurate information on the underlying state than the lower
levels(see Fig.1). The proposed adaptive polling mechanism
for hierarchical social networks also takes this into account.
We formulate adaptive generalizations of the Intent Polling and
Expectation Polling methods3 [18] in Sec.III-A and Sec.III-B,
and Neighbourhood Expectation Polling [19] based on Friend-
ship Paradox4 in Sec.III-C.
(ii) Blackwell Dominance in Hierarchical Networks: As men-
tioned above, in general, solving a POMDP is computationally
intractable (see Footnote 1). A key property of our adaptive
polling POMDP is that it exhibits a Blackwell dominance
structure. For such POMDPs, a myopic policy provably forms
an upper bound to the optimal policy (Theorem 2). For the
three adaptive polling POMDPs considered, namely, intent
3 Intention: Who will you vote for?
Expectation: Who do you think will win?
4The friendship paradox [20] refers to the phenomenon that on average
your friends have more friends than you; see Sec.III-C for a more precise
statement. Neighborhood Expectation Polling asks: What is a your estimate
of the fraction of votes for a particular candidate?
polling, expectation polling and neighbourhood expectation
polling, we present several novel sufficient conditions for
Blackwell dominance involving matrix polynomial functions
(Proposition 1) and ultrametric matrices (Proposition 2). This
in turn facilitates the comparison of Rényi Divergence and
Shannon capacity of more general channels that arise naturally
in hierarchical social networks. For example, Proposition 1
provides an interesting link between Hurwitz (stable) polyno-
mials and Shannon capacity.
(iii) Approximate Blackwell Dominance: Blackwell dominance
induces a partial order between two stochastic matrices imply-
ing not every pair is comparable. However, the upper bounds
in Theorem 2 provide sufficient motivation to find a pair of
matrices that are close to the given pair and are Blackwell
comparable. Sec.IV defines the notion of closeness between
stochastic matrices using Le Cam deficiency. Using this notion
of approximate Blackwell dominance, we discuss how to
design polling POMDPs that allow a comparison between the
three proposed polling mechanisms. The performance bounds
of the mis-specified POMDP model and policy are provided.
We also discuss ordinal sensitivity in polling hierarchical
networks, where we show that some networks are inherently
more expensive to poll than others.
Sec.V provides numerical examples that illustrate the myopic
polling policies.
C. Related Literature
[21] analyzes a Bayesian approach to intent and expecta-
tion polling, but without feedback control. Polling has been
considered in [18] and a comparison of intent and expectation
polling (non-Bayesian) algorithms is discussed5. A trade-off
between number of polled individuals and the bias introduced
due to the network structure is discussed in [22]. Adaptive
or feedback based approaches to similar problems have been
considered in [23], [24].
II. ADAPTIVE POLLING IN HIERARCHICAL SOCIAL
NETWORKS
This section formulates the adaptive polling problem as
a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP).
Sec.II-A introduces the model for the adaptive polling problem
and Sec.II-C formulates the adaptive polling problem as a
POMDP. Then the main result, namely, sufficient conditions on
the model parameters that enable us to compute myopic upper
bounds for the optimal policy, are provided using Blackwell
dominance.
A. Polling Model and Notation
Consider the hierarchical social network6 shown in Fig.1.
State: Let xk ∈ X = {1, 2, · · · , X} denote a Markov
chain evolving at discrete time instants k = 0, 1, · · · on a
5 [18] analyzes all US presidential electoral college results from 1952 −
2008 where both intention and expectation polling were conducted and shows
a remarkable result: In 77 cases where expectation and intent polling pointed
to different winners, expectation polling was accurate 78% of the time!
6It is to be noted that, the interconnection in the actual social network
connecting the people or nodes is irrelevant given the hierarchical influence.
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Fig. 1. The figure shows a simple hierarchical (influence) network where the
individuals are grouped into N + 1 levels Level 0, Level 1, · · · ,Level N in
a hierarchical fashion. Each level influences the opinion of the level below it.
The network or population has an opinion on the state xk . A pollster samples
a subset of individuals and considers the (majority or fraction) opinion yk ,
runs a local filter to compute the state estimate, and chooses a control to
affect the (future) polling mechanism. The aim of the pollster is to estimate
the underlying state by controlling the dynamics of polling, while incurring
minimum cost.
finite state space and observed in noise. This state models the
parameters of interest that the population is exposed to. For
example, the state x(Interest Level) = {High,Medium,Low}
could model the interest polling of products; or the state
x(Most Likely Candidate) = {Cand.1,Cand.2 · · ·Cand.X}
could model electoral polling; etc.
Pollster’s Control/ actions: Let U = {1, 2, · · · , U} denote
the set of possible controls (actions), with uk ∈ U denoting
the action chosen at time k. The action is the decision chosen
by the pollster and depends on the polling mechanism (see
Sec.III-A for adaptive intent polling, Sec.III-B for adaptive
expectation polling, and Sec.III-C for adaptive friendship
polling).
Having defined the state and action spaces, we now define the
parameters of the POMDP (Sec.II-C).
Transition matrix: Let P denote the homogeneous transition
probability matrix of the Markov chain xk with elements
Pij = P(xk+1 = j|xk = i), i, j ∈ X . (5)
Here the transition matrix P (6= I) captures situations, for
example, where political candidates make changes in response
to public perception, or the changing interest level in a new
app/ product.
Polling Cost: Let C(xk, uk) denote the instantaneous cost
incurred by the pollster for taking action uk when in state xk.
As will be described in Sec.III, this models the measurement
cost and quality (accuracy) of the polling mechanism.
Opinion: An opinion indicates the view formed on the un-
derlying state xk by interacting with other nodes and the
environment. Let ylk ∈ Y denote the opinion of nodes at level
l of the hierarchical network (see Fig.1). Here |Y| = |X | but
the elements could be different (see Sec.II-B). The observation
at different levels in the hierarchical social network assume
the following structure: observation at the topmost level y0k
is directly influenced by the state xk. Observation y
l
k, l ≥ 0
influences yl+1k (see Fig.1), i.e,
P(yl+1k = j|y
l
k = i, xk = x) ≅ P(y
l+1
k = j|y
l
k = i). (6)
Discussion of (6): The approximation (6) says that the likeli-
hood probabilities of an opinion is mostly influenced by direct
superiors or influencers. Even if individuals observe the state,
the opinion on the state formed7 depends mostly on more
‘informed’ sources. The approximation (6) is reasonable in a
number of scenarios: knowledge dissemination on the web via
Wikipedia, where a minority (2%) of internet users produce
the content the great majority consumes [9]; in social media
like Twitter [10], where small group of ‘opinion leaders’ gather
most of the attention; in judicial hierarchy [11], where lower
court judges are influenced by their direct superiors and courts
above them; etc.
The information flow in Fig.1 proceeds according to the
following protocol for k = 0, 1, · · ·
1) The state xk evolves on time scale k.
2) Opinions ylk are formed at the Level l at time k¯ = k+ lδ.
3) At time k + 1, state transitions to xk+1.
In this protocol, it is assumed that Nδ ≪ 1. In other words,
the state xk is evolving over a slower time-scale than the time-
scale over which the opinions are formed across the network
given in Fig.1. Thus, k¯ = k + lδ ∼ k.
Let the opinion distribution at Level 0 be given by the
confusion matrix denoted as H0, with elements
(H0)ij = P(y
0
k = j|xk = i), i ∈ X , j ∈ Y. (7)
The opinions at levels l ∈ {1, · · · , N} in the hierarchical
network are influenced by the preceding levels (see Fig.1).
The confusion matrix Hll−1 between levels l − 1 and l has
elements
(Hll−1)ij = P(y
l
k = j|y
l−1
k = i), ∀i, j ∈ Y, l ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
(8)
For tractability, assume that the confusion matrix between
successive levels is modeled using the same distribution B
in (7), i.e,
∀ l ∈ {1, · · · , N}, Hll−1 = B = H0. (9)
So the opinions at levels l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} have an effective
opinion distribution
Bl = B
l+1, (10)
where Bl denotes the opinion distribution at level l.
Pollster’s observation: Let Y denote a countable set of
observations with yk ∈ Y representing the observations of the
underlying state xk ∈ X . The observations model the infor-
mation on the state gathered via views/ sentiments expressed
by the nodes or individuals in the hierarchical social network
7The way individuals form an opinion is not considered in this paper. Be-
havioural economics models use (communicative rationality) [25], (motivated
reasoning) [26], to model this.
4(see Fig.1). As will be mentioned in Sec.III, depending on the
polling mechanism, we consider two types of observations for
the pollster:
(i) Majority opinion gathering (Sec.III-A and Sec.III-B),
where8 |Y| = |Y|. The pollster samples nodes at various levels
and considers the majority opinion reported. In case of a tie,
an opinion from the majority opinions is randomly selected.
(ii) Fraction opinion gathering (Sec.III-C), where9 Y =
{0, 1Y ,
2
Y , · · · , 1}
|X | for some Y > 0. So in case of fraction
opinion gathering, the observations for the pollster are tuples
denoting the fraction in favor of each of the states.
Pollster’s Observation distribution: Let O(u) denote the
observation probability matrix with elements
Oij(u) = P(yk+1 = j|xk+1 = i, uk = u), i ∈ X , j ∈ Y.
(11)
The observation matrix/ distribution O(u) models the like-
lihood of different public opinions given the state, and is
different for different polling mechanisms (see Sec.III).
B. Example illustrating the model:
In election polling, the state could be modeled as
x(Likely Candidate) = {Cand.1,Cand.2}, the opinion formed
by the nodes at Level l could be modeled as yl ∈ Y =
{Consider voting for Cand.1,Consider voting for Cand.2}.
The pollster’s observations in case of majority
opinion gathering could be modeled as y ∈ Y =
{Cand.1 has majority vote,Cand.2 has majority vote} and in
case of fraction opinion gathering, the pollster’s observations
are fractions y ∈ Y = {Fraction considering Cand.1} ×
{Fraction considering Cand.2}.
C. Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
We now formulate the adaptive polling problem as a
POMDP using the model in Sec.II-A. We refer to [5] for a
detailed treatment of POMDPs - here due to space restrictions
we give a very terse description.
Belief: Let the probability mass function, termed as the belief,
of the state at time k − 1 be denoted as
pik−1(i) = P(x = i|y1, . . . , yk−1) for i ∈ X . (12)
The state estimate (12) is computed from the opinions gathered
by the pollster, and is a sufficient statistic [5] for the history of
actions and opinions {u1, y1, . . . , uk−1, yk−1}. Let the initial
estimate be denoted as pi0 = (pi0(i), i ∈ X ), where pi0(i) =
P(x0 = i). Note that the belief pi lives in theX−1 dimensional
unit simplex Π(X) = {pi : pi(i) ∈ [0, 1],
∑X
i=1 pi(i) = 1}.
We refer to Π(X) as the belief space. As is well known in
POMDPs, instantaneous cost C(pik, uk) in terms of the belief
pik given by
C(pik, uk) =
∑
i
C(xk = i, uk)pik(i), (13)
8Here |X | denotes the cardinality of the set X .
9Here SY = S × S × · · ·S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
denotes the ususal Cartesian product of sets.
where pik denotes the probability distribution function (12) at
time k. Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] denote an economic discount factor.
An infinite horizon discounted cost POMDP is the tuple θ =
(X ,Y,U , C, P,O(u), ρ) with dynamics given by the Bayesian
filtering update
pik = T (pik−1, yk, uk), where T (pi, y, u) =
Oy(u)P
′pi
1′Oy(u)P ′pi
(14)
and Oy(u) = diag(O1,y(u), · · · , OX,y(u)).
Associated with a stationary (time independent) policy µ :
Π(X) → U and initial belief pi0 ∈ Π(X), is the infinite
horizon discounted cost [5]:
Jµ(pi0; θ) = Eµ{
∞∑
k=0
ρkC(pik, uk = µ(pik))}. (15)
Here Jµ(pi0; θ) denotes the cumulative cost for the POMDP
model θ. The objective of the POMDP is to find the optimal
stationary polling policy µ∗ such that
Jµ∗(pi0; θ) = infµ∈µJµ(pi0; θ) (16)
where µ denotes the class of stationary policies. Obtaining the
optimal policy µ∗ is equivalent to solving Bellman’s dynamic
programming equation:
µ∗(pi) = argmin
u∈U
Q(pi, u), Jµ∗(pi; θ) = V (pi), (17)
V (pi) = min
u∈U
Q(pi, u),
Q(pi, u) = C(pi, u) + ρ
∑
y∈Y
V (T (pi, y, u))σ(pi, y, u).
Since the belief space Π(X) is a continuum, Bellman’s
equation (17) does not translate into practical solution method-
ologies as V (pi) needs to be evaluated at each pi ∈ Π(X).
The computation of optimal policy of the POMDP is P-
SPACE hard [13]. The costs C(pi, u) capture the cost of
measurement and the uncertainty or error in the state estimate,
and hence are non-linear in the belief; and this results in a
non-standard10 POMDP. This motivates the construction of
optimal upper bound policy µ¯(pi) to the optimal policy µ∗(pi)
that is inexpensive to compute. In the remainder of the paper,
we construct such upper bound policies in terms of easily
computable myopic policies for adaptive polling POMDPs.
Remark: Our adaptive polling formulation in terms of an infi-
nite horizon POMDP (15) is purely for notational convenience;
the optimal policy is stationary. The results in this paper also
hold for a finite horizon formulation - then the optimal policy
is non-stationary, but Theorem 2 and all subsequent results in
this paper continue to hold.
D. Main Result. Optimality of Myopic Polling Policies
The aim of the pollster is to estimate the (underlying)
evolving state xk by incurring minimum cumulative cost (15).
The pollster employs the control uk = µ
∗(pik−1) to obtain
opinions (yk ∈ Y) from the nodes, and then updates the
belief pik−1 → pik about the underlying state xk ∈ X
10POMDP solvers can only handle POMDPs with linear costs, see [5].
5using (14). Theorem 2 below provides sufficient conditions on
the observation distribution of the pollster O(u) such that a
myopic polling policy upper bounds the optimal polling policy
in (16).
Define the myopic policy µ¯(pi) as
µ¯(pi) = argmin
u∈U
C(pi, u) (18)
Theorem 2 (Optimality of Myopic Policies via Blackwell
Dominance). Consider the adaptive polling POMDP formu-
lated in Sec.II-C. Assume that the cost C(pi, u) is concave
in pi. Suppose O(u) B O(u+1) ∀u ∈ U . Then µ¯(pi) defined
in (18) is an upper bound to the optimal polling policy µ∗(pi)
defined in (17), i.e, µ∗(pi) ≤ µ¯(pi) for all pi ∈ Π. In particular,
for belief states where µ¯(pi) = 1, the myopic policy coincides
with the optimal policy µ∗(pi).
Discussion: Theorem 2 is a well known structural result
for POMDPs [5], and it says that if the instantaneous cost
of choosing the more accurate/ informative polling control is
smaller, then it is the optimal control to choose for the polling
POMDP.
(i) Note that the trivial sub-optimal policy µˆ(pi) = 1 ∀pi ∈
Π(X) is also an upper bound to the optimal policy - but an
useless upper bound because µ∗(pi) = 1 =⇒ µˆ(pi) = 1.
In comparison, the upper bound constructed via Theorem 2
(Blackwell dominance) says that µ¯(pi) = 1 =⇒ µ∗(pi) = 1,
which is a much more useful construction. Thus, the myopic
polling policy forms a provably optimal upper bound to the
computationally intractable optimal policy.
(ii) The usefulness of Theorem 2 stems from the fact that
µ¯(pi) is straightforward to compute, and the only condition
on the model parameters being the concavity of the cost and
Blackwell dominance of the observation distributions.
Theorem 2 serves as a meta-theorem and sets the stage for
the rest of the paper. In the remainder of the paper, we will
determine novel sufficient conditions for Blackwell dominance
in the context of adaptive polling.
E. Blackwell Ordering and Rényi Divergence Interpretation
Rényi Divergence is a generalization of the Kullback-
Leibler divergence [15], and it measures the dissimilarity
between two distributions. Theorem 3 below shows the relation
between Rényi Divergence and Blackwell dominance.
With a slight abuse of notation in (11), let Oi(u) denote
the ith row of the observation likelihood matrix O(u). In
words, Oi(u) is the distribution over the observation alphabet
Y conditional on the state x = i.
Rényi Divergence: For an observation likelihood O(u), the
Rényi Divergence of order α ∈ [0, 1) for i, j ∈ X is defined
as
Dα(Oi(u)||Oj(u)) =
1
α− 1
log
∑
y∈Y
Oαiy(u)O
α−1
jy (u). (19)
Theorem 3 (Ordering of Rényi Divergence). If the observation
distribution for the pollster satisfy O(u) B O(u+1) ∀u ∈ U ,
then for any i, j ∈ X :
Dα(Oi(u)||Oj(u)) ≥ Dα(Oi(u+ 1)||Oj(u+ 1)) ∀u ∈ U .
(20)
Discussion: Theorem 3 says that when O(u) B O(u+1),
conditional on the state, the observation distributions are more
dissimilar in case of O(u). Here, more the dissimilarity, better
the pollster is able to distinguish the states. In Sec.III, we
discuss the ordering of Rényi Divergence for more general
channels that arise in hierarchical social networks. Theorem 3
provides a ranking of these general channel structures in the
order of their ability to distinguish the states.
III. ADAPTIVE POLLING AND BLACKWELL DOMINANCE
Armed with the POMDP formulation of the previous sec-
tion, in this section we give sufficient conditions for Blackwell
dominance of Theorem 2 to hold for three polling mechanisms:
(i) Adaptive Intent Polling (Sec.III-A), (ii) Adaptive Expec-
tation Polling (Sec.III-B), (iii) Adaptive Friendship Polling
(Sec.III-C).
The formulations in this section are adaptive (feedback control
based) generalizations of the intent and expectation polling
[18], [22], and the recently proposed Neighbourhood Expecta-
tion Polling [19] mechanisms, to account for the time varying
state and the hierarchical influence structure present in social
networks.
A. Adaptive Intent Polling
In adaptive intent polling, a node at level l is sampled with
a probability βl and is asked the following question:
“What does it (a node at level l) think the state is?”
This polling mechanism is a more sophisticated version of
standard intent polling, for multiple states and hierarchical
social networks. In intent polling [18], to decide between two
states, the sampled individuals are asked “who would you vote
for?".
In the adaptive intent polling formulation below, the pollster
adapts the polling policies, namely, the probabilities with
which the nodes at different levels in the hierarchical social
network are polled. This affects the observation distribution
O(u), and hence the state estimate (see Fig.1).
1) Intent Polling Costs: The instantaneous cost in the
adaptive intent polling problem consists of two components–
the measurement cost and the entropy cost (uncertainty in the
state estimate):
i.) Measurement Cost: Let u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , U} model
the choice of distributions (polling actions) β(u),
where β(u) = (β
(u)
0 , β
(u)
1 , · · ·β
(u)
N ) and
∑
i β
(u)
i = 1.
Here β
(u)
l for l = 0, 1, 2 · · · , N denotes the probability
of selecting a node from level l, having an opinion distri-
bution Bl+1. Let s(l) denote the measurement cost from
level l. Since nodes at higher levels in the hierarchy (small
l) provide more informative (in the Blackwell sense)
observations, higher costs are associated with obtaining
observations from these levels, i.e, s(l) ≥ s(l + 1), and
the average measurement cost for employing the polling
mechanism β(u) is S(β(u)) =
∑N
l=0 β
(u)
l s(l).
6ii.) Entropy Cost: The entropy cost models the uncertainty in
the state estimate pi (12), and is given as
ηE(pi, u) = −γ1(u)
2∑
i=1
pi(i)log2pi(i) + γ2(u)
for pik(i) ∈ (0, 1) and ηE
∆
=0 for pik(i) = {0, 1}. Here
γ1, γ2 > 0 are user defined scalar weights.
Since more informative opinions lead to larger reduction
in uncertainty, γ1(u) > γ1(u+1) and γ2(u+1) > γ2(u).
The instantaneous cost C(pi, u) in (13) incurred by the pollster
in case of adaptive intent polling is thus given as:
C(pi, u) = S(β(u)) + ηE(pi, u). (21)
The cost (21) expressed in terms of the belief state pi captures
the fact that a control with higher measurement cost should
result in a smaller entropy (more reduction in uncertainty) cost
and vice versa.
2) Main Result. Myopic Policies for Adaptive Intent Polling:
Our main result on adaptive intent polling is Theorem 4 below.
It shows that when it cheaper for the pollster to (myopically)
listen to the polynomial channel that provides largest reduction
in uncertainty on the state, it is indeed optimal to do that.
Polynomial channels are parallel cascaded channels that model
the communication medium between the pollster and the nodes
of a social network having a hierarchical influence structure as
in Fig.1, when the pollster polls all levels of the hierarchical
network as in intent polling.
Let fu(z) =
∑N
l=0 β
(u)
l z
l denote the polynomial correspond-
ing to the polling policy β(u). For an opinion distribution B
(defined in (9)), let the matrix polynomials be fu(B) ∀u ∈ U .
Theorem 4 (Adaptive Intent Polling). Consider the adap-
tive intent polling problem with costs specified in (21). Let
the observation distribution for the pollster be11 O(u) =
Bfu(B) ∀u ∈ U . Assume that the polynomial fU (z) ∈ PN is
Hurwitz12.
(i) Then, O(u) B O(u + 1) ∀u ∈ U .
(ii) By Theorem 2, the myopic intent polling policy µ¯I(pi)
forms an upper bound to the optimal intent polling policy
µ∗I(pi), i.e, µ
∗
I(pi) ≤ µ¯I(pi) for all pi ∈ Π. In particular, for
belief states where µ¯I(pi) = 1, the myopic policy coincides
with the optimal policy µ∗I(pi).
Discussion: The instantaneous cost for adaptive intent
polling (21) is concave in pi by definition. The proof of Theo-
rem 4 follows from Proposition 1 below and Theorem 2. The
adaptive intent polling mechanism employed by the pollster
determines how the opinions are gathered, and the opinions
are distributed as O(u) for the pollster. For an opinion distri-
bution B, the observation distribution of the pollster in case
of adaptive intent polling is given as O(u) = Bfu(B), where
fu(B) =
∑N
l=0 β
(u)
l B
l and nodes at level l are sampled with
probability β
(u)
l . Proposition 1 below provides a justification
11The matrix polynomial fu(B) has an identity observation likelihood for
the co-efficient β
(u)
0 . This motivates the choice O(u) = Bfu(B) ∀u ∈ U .
12A polynomial f is Hurwitz if all its zeroes lie in the open left half-plane
of the complex plane, and all its co-efficients have the same sign.
for the polynomial fU (z) to be Hurwitz. If fU (z) is Hurwitz,
then a way to compute fg(z) for g ∈ {U − 1, · · · , 2, 1} is
by successive long-division of fU (z) by linear or quadratic
factors of fU (z).
3) Matrix polynomials and Blackwell Dominance:
Let PN = {h|h(z) =
∑N
i=0 βiz
i,
∑N
i=0 βi = 1, βi ≥ 0}
denote the collection of all polynomials with co-efficients that
are a convex combination.
Proposition 1. Let Q be a stochastic matrix. For n > m,
let p(z) ∈ Pn and q(z) ∈ Pm be two polynomials such that
all the roots of q(z) are roots of p(z). If q(z) and p(z) are
Hurwitz, then q(Q) B p(Q).
Discussion: According to Proposition 1, if the polynomials
are Hurwitz and have common factors, a Blackwell dominance
relation exists between their corresponding matrix polynomi-
als. If, however, p(z) ∈ Pn is not a Hurwitz polynomial,
then q(Q) B p(Q) only if the polynomial q(z) ∈ Pm is
the single quadratic factor (m = 2) corresponding to any
conjugate pair of zeros of p(z) having smallest argument in
magnitude; see [27].
Proposition 1 provides a way to (partially) order the obser-
vation distributions, and hence is useful in choosing a polling
action. In adaptive intent polling (Theorem 4), the degree of
the polynomial is the same as the number of levels in the
hierarchy (Fig.1). A polling action in adaptive intent polling
corresponds to choosing the (normalized) co-efficients of a
polynomial, and these coefficients are the probabilities of
polling from the various levels of the social network. From
Proposition 1, if the two polling actions are such that the
corresponding polynomials are Hurwitz and have common
factors, then there exists a Blackwell dominance relation
between the observation likelihoods corresponding to the two
polling actions.
Information Theoretic Consequence: Let I(X ;Y(u)) denote
the mutual information of channel fu(B) and C(u) denote the
capacity defined in (4). Let f iu(B) denote the i
th row of the
matrix polynomial fu(B).
Corollary 1.1. If the channel error probabilities (likelihoods)
for the pollster satisfy fu(B) B fu+1(B) ∀u ∈ U , then
i.) Shannon Capacity Ordering: C(u) ≥ C(u+1) ∀u ∈ U .
ii.) Rényi Divergence Ordering:
Dα(f
i
u(B)||f
j
u(B)) ≥ Dα(f
i
u+1(B)||f
j
u+1(B))
for all u ∈ U and for all i, j ∈ X .
Discussion: The proof of Corollary 1.1 follows from The-
orem 1 and Theorem 3. From Corollary 1.1, the Hurwitz
polynomial channels are ordered such that the channel that
is a sub channel of the other results in a larger reduction in
uncertainty on the state.
Together with Proposition 1, Corollary 1.1 provides an
interesting link between Hurwitz (stable) polynomials and
channel capacity. From Proposition 1, those polling actions
that result in Hurwitz (stable) polynomials allow decomposi-
tion of channels into sub channels that have higher capacity
from Corollary 1.1.
7B. Adaptive Expectation Polling
In adaptive expectation polling, the pollster changes the
question instead to
“what does a node at level i think
the nodes at level j(< i) would report the state as?”
This polling mechanism is a more sophisticated version of
standard expectation polling, for multiple states and hierar-
chical social networks. In expectation polling [18], to decide
between two states, the sampled individuals are asked “who
would your friends vote for?". In a hierarchical network, this
can be seen as asking “who would your more influential
friends vote for?".
In the adaptive expectation polling formulation below, the
pollster controls the observation distribution O(u) by choosing
different levels to gather the majority opinion, and this in turn
affects the estimate of the state (see Fig.1).
1) Expectation Polling Costs: The instantaneous cost in
the adaptive expectation polling problem consists of two
components– the measurement cost and the uncertainty in the
state estimate:
i.) Measurement Cost: Let u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , U} model the
choice of levels. In adaptive expectation polling, unlike
adaptive intent polling, not all levels are polled. The
pollster selects a level l and asks the nodes at level
l to provide information about the other levels. Let
S(u) denote the measurement cost for action u. Since
more informative opinions are costlier to obtain, from
Theorem 5(i) below, S(u) ≥ S(u+ 1) ∀u ∈ U .
ii.) State-Estimation error: The state-estimation error in-
curred in choosing action u is modelled as
η2(x¯, u) = wu‖x¯− pi‖2. (22)
In (22), pi denotes the posterior distribution updated
according to (14) and x¯ ∈ {e1, e2, · · · , eX}, where ei is
the unit indicator vector. In (22) using the law of iterated
expectation, η2(pi, u) can be expressed in terms of the
belief pi as follows [5]:
η2(pi, u) = wu (1− pi
′pi) (23)
Since more informative opinions lead to smaller state-
estimation error, from Theorem 5(i) below, wu+1 > wu.
The instantaneous cost C(pi, u) in (13) incurred by the pollster
in case of adaptive expectation polling is thus given as:
C(pi, u) = S(u) + η2(pi, u) (24)
The cost (24) expressed in terms of the belief state pi models
the fact that asking the nodes at level i to provide information
on the opinions of nodes at levels j(< i) is costly, but more
informative – smaller state estimation error.
2) Main Result. Myopic policies for Adaptive Expectation
Polling: Our main result in adaptive expectation polling is
Theorem 5 below. It shows that when it is cheaper for the
pollster to (myopically) listen to the ultrametric13 channel
13A square stochastic matrix Q is ultrametric if
1) Q is symmetric.
that provides the most information on the state, it is indeed
optimal to do that. Ultrametric channels are (hidden) cascaded
channels that model the communication medium between the
pollster and the nodes of a social network having a hierarchical
influence structure as in Fig.1, when the pollster seeks opinions
formed at the hidden levels from the levels that are easily
accessible.
Theorem 5 (Adaptive Expectation Polling). Consider the
adaptive expectation polling problem with costs specified in
(24). Assume that the opinion distribution B (defined in (9))
is ultrametric. Let the observation distributions for the pollster
be O(u) = B
lu/l
l ∀u ∈ U .
(i) For the choice of levels lu > lu+1, we have
O(u) B O(u+ 1) ∀u ∈ U .
(ii) By Theorem 2, the myopic expectation polling policy
µ¯E(pi) forms an upper bound to the optimal expectation
polling policy µ∗E(pi), i.e, µ
∗
E(pi) ≤ µ¯E(pi) for all pi ∈ Π.
In particular, for belief states where µ¯E(pi) = 1, the myopic
policy coincides with the optimal policy µ∗E(pi).
Discussion: The instantaneous cost for adaptive expectation
polling (24) is concave in pi by definition. The proof of
Theorem 5 follows from Proposition 2 below and Theorem 2.
The expectation polling mechanism employed by the pollster
determines how the opinions are gathered, and the opinions
are distributed as O(u) for the pollster. Proposition 2 below
provides a justification for the opinion distribution B to be
ultrametric. Note that Bl denotes the opinion distribution at
level l, i.e, Bl = B
l+1 from Fig.1. For any K > 0, clearly
B
j+1/K+1
K = Bj . This motivates the choice of the observation
distribution of the pollster in case of adaptive expectation
polling as O(u) = B
lu/l
l , where nodes at level l are polled
to provide information of the nodes at level lu. It is easiest
(see Sec.V) to poll nodes at level N , so a convenient choice
is O(u) = B
lu/N+1
N+1 .
3) Fractional Exponents of Stochastic Matrices and Black-
well Dominance: For any ultrametric matrix Q, the Kth root,
Q1/K , is also stochastic for any positive integer K; see [28].
Proposition 2. For any ultrametric matrix Q, the following
hold for any positive integer j:
a) Qj/K B Qj .
b) Qj/K B Q(j+1)/K . . . B Q(j+K−1)/K
c) Qj/(K+1) B Qj/(K).
d) Q B Qj/K , for all j > K .
Discussion: Clearly, Kth integer power of a stochastic
matrix is a stochastic matrix. Proposition 2 says that fractional
power of certain stochastic matrices, namely ultrametric, are
also stochastic. In adaptive expectation polling (Theorem 5),
polling actions correspond to choosing different levels in the
hierarchy (Fig.1) and soliciting opinions of nodes at other
levels. In Proposition 2, Qj+1/K+1 can be used to interpret
the notion of node at level K providing information on nodes’
2) Qij ≥ min{Qik, Bkj} for all i, j, k.
3) Qii > maxQik for all k 6= i.
8opinions at level j, and hence provides a way to order the
likelihoods corresponding to different polling actions. Accord-
ing to Proposition 2, when the opinion distribution B in (7)
is ultrametric, there exists a Blackwell dominance relation
between the observation distributions of the pollster.
Information Theoretic Consequence: Let I(X ;Y(lu)) denote
the mutual information of the ultrametric channel Qlu/K and
C(lu) denote the capacity defined in (4). Let Q
lu/K
i denotes
the ith row of the channel Qlu/K .
Corollary 2.1. If the channel error probabilities (likelihoods)
for the pollster satisfy Qlu/K B Qlv/K for any K > 0, we
have
i.) Shannon Capacity Ordering: C(lu) ≥ C(lv) for lu > lv .
ii.) Rényi Divergence Ordering:
Dα(Q
lu/K
i ||Q
lu/K
j ) ≥ Dα(Q
lv/K
i ||Q
lv/K
j )
for all u ∈ U and for all i, j ∈ X .
Discussion: The proof of Corollary 2.1 follows from Theo-
rem 1 and Theorem 3. Corollary 2.1 provides an ordering of
Rényi Divergence and Shannon capacity between ultrametric
channels Qlu/K , K > 0, ∀u ∈ U . From Corollary 2.1, the
ultrametric channels are ordered such that the information
of nodes at Level 0, for example, revealed by the nodes at
Level N(6= 0) result in a larger reduction in uncertainty on
the state, than opinions from nodes at Level N(6= 0).
C. Adaptive Friendship Polling
In this section, the majority reporting is relaxed to obtaining
opinion fractions from the nodes. Each polled node gathers the
opinion from other nodes at the same level on each state and
reports the fraction to the pollster. The question asked by the
pollster in case of adaptive friendship polling is
“what does a node at level l think the fraction
in favor of different states is, at level l?”
This polling mechanism is a more sophisticated version
of Neighborhood Expectation Polling (NEP) [19],
for multiple states and hierarchical social networks.
NEP is a polling mechanism to decide between two
states, and is based on “Friendship Paradox" [20],
[29]. The friendship paradox14 is usually expressed as
“on average your friends have more friends than you do"
and the polling based on the friendship paradox is [19] “what
is a nodes’ estimate of the fraction of votes for a particular
candidate?". In the adaptive friendship polling formulation
below, the pollster controls the observation distribution O(u)
by choosing different levels to gather the information in the
form of fractions, and this in turn affects the estimate of the
state (see Fig.1).
1) Friendship Polling Costs: The instantaneous cost in
the adaptive friendship polling problem consists of two
components– the measurement cost and the error in the state
estimate:
14Friendship Paradox [20]: Let X denote a random node and Y denote a
random neighbor. Then Ed(X) ≤ Ed(Y ), where d(.) denotes the degree.
i.) Measurement Cost: Let u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , U} denote the
control inputs that model the choice of level. In adaptive
friendship polling, the nodes at level l are polled to
provide information on the fraction of the nodes at level
l in favor of each of the states. Let S(u) denote the
measurement cost for action u. Since more informative
opinion fractions are costlier to obtain, from (28) below,
S(u) ≥ S(u+ 1) ∀u ∈ U .
ii.) State-Estimation error: The state-estimation error in-
curred in choosing action u is modelled as in (23)
η2(pi, u) = wu (1− pi
′pi) (25)
where wu > 0 is a is a user-defined scaling factor.
Since more informative opinions lead to smaller state-
estimation error, from (28) below, wu+1 > wu.
The instantaneous cost C(pi, u) in (13) incurred by the pollster
in case of adaptive friendship polling is given as:
C(pi, u) = S(u) + η2(pi, u) (26)
2) Multinomial distribution and Blackwell Dominance:
The adaptive friendship polling mechanism employed by the
pollster determines how the opinions are gathered, and the
observations for the pollster are tuples reported by the nodes
that indicate the fraction in favor of each state. Channels
specified by multinomial distributions model the likelihood of
opinion counts in favor of different states from different nodes
at the same level. Let N ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N} denote the number
of nodes accessible (friends with) to nodes at each level in
the hierarchical social network. This models the possibility
of different individuals or nodes having different friends with
N denoting a finite maximum number. Let the observation
alphabet for the pollster be Y = {(n1N ,
n2
N , · · · ,
nX
N ) ∀ N :
ni ∈ Z+,
∑
i ni = N}, where Z+ denotes the set of non-
negative integers. Let O(l) denote the opinion fraction that the
pollster receives from level l, and has elements
(O(l))ij = P(y
l
k+1 = j|xk+1 = i), i ∈ X , j ∈ Y .
Here j = (
n
(j)
1
Nj
,
n
(j)
2
Nj
, · · · ,
n
(j)
X
Nj
), Nj ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N},
∑
h
n
(j)
h = Nj .
P
(
ylk+1 = j|xk+1 = i
)
=
Nj !
n
(j)
1 !× · · · × n
(j)
X !
X∏
h=1
(Bl)
n
(j)
h
ih .
(27)
Here Nj and n
(j)
i indicate the total and the number in favor of
x = i reported and Bl denotes the opinion distribution (10) at
level l. The likelihood in (27) is the well known multinomial
distribution.
Remark: In case of adaptive friendship polling, the nodes
report opinion fractions to the pollster. If instead, the nodes
report probabilities with Y = [0, 1]|X |, there is a possibil-
ity that the pollster receives biased information. There is a
disjunction effect – the beliefs about the state change when
aggregated differently. This is the well known Simpson’s
Paradox; see [30].
9Suppose15 for an opinion distribution B (defined in (9)), the
opinion fractions corresponding to choosing different levels
(polling actions) are ordered as,
O(u) B O(u + 1) for u ∈ U . (28)
It is intuitive that the opinion fractions in (27) from nodes at
level i are more informative than opinion fractions from nodes
at level j(> i) in Fig.1 owing to obvious Blackwell dominance
relation of opinion distributions Bl for l = i, j in (10).
Theorem 6 (Adaptive Friendship Polling). Consider the adap-
tive friendship polling problem with costs specified in (26).
By (28) and Theorem 2, the myopic friendship polling policy
µ¯F (pi) forms an upper bound to the optimal friendship polling
policy µ∗F (pi), i.e, µ
∗
F (pi) ≤ µ¯F (pi) for all pi ∈ Π. In particular,
for belief states where µ¯F (pi) = 1, the myopic policy coincides
with the optimal policy µ∗F (pi).
Information Theoretic Consequence: Let I(X ;Y(u)) denote
the mutual information of channel O(u) and C(u) denote the
capacity defined in (4). Let (O(u))i denote the i
th row of the
multinomial likelihood O(u) in (27).
Proposition 3. For the channel error probabilities (likeli-
hoods) O(u) B O(u + 1), we have
i.) Shannon Capacity Ordering: C(u) ≥ C(u+1) for u ∈ U .
ii.) Rényi Divergence Ordering:
Dα((O(u))i||(O(u))j) ≥ Dα((O(u+1))i||(O(u+1)j)
for all u ∈ U and for all i, j ∈ X .
Discussion: The proof of Proposition 3 follows from The-
orem 1 and Theorem 3. When the pollster solicits opinion
fractions from the nodes at different levels, the observation
likelihood is given by the multinomial (counting) distribution.
Proposition 3 provides an ordering of Rényi Divergence and
Shannon capacity between channels whose error probabilities
are the given by the multinomial distributions of likelihoods
Bl in (10). From Proposition 3, the fractions received from
Level 0 in Fig.1 results in the largest reduction in uncertainty
for the pollster.
IV. APPROXIMATE BLACKWELL DOMINANCE,
PERFORMANCE BOUNDS, AND ORDINAL SENSITIVITY
So far we have discussed sufficient conditions for Blackwell
dominance; when these conditions hold, the optimal adaptive
polling policy is provably upper bounded by a myopic policy.
This section discusses approximate Blackwell dominance and
the performance loss due to this approximation.
A. Le Cam Deficiency
Given a collection of matrices, it is important to check
whether there exists a Blackwell dominance relation, as The-
orem 2 can used to compute inexpensive policies. What if
the pollster would like to choose between different polling
mechanisms at each polling epoch to estimate the state?
15In Sec.IV (specifically, Algorithm 1) we will see how to obtain (ap-
proximate) Blackwell dominance of observation distributions using Le Cam
deficiency if they are not Blackwell comparable a priori.
Algorithm 1 Approximate Blackwell Dominance
Let M denotes the set of all stochastic matrices.
Initialize: O(1) = Oˆ(1)
For u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , U − 1}, do:
R∗u+1 = argminR∈M ‖O(u+ 1)− Oˆ(u)R‖
Oˆ(u + 1) = Oˆ(u)R∗u+1
end
Output: Oˆ(u) for u ∈ U .
Now the control inputs u ∈ U correspond to choosing
between the different polling mechanisms. From discussion
in Sec.III, it is clear that there is no apparent ordering of
observation distributions of the three polling mechanisms.
In this section, an approximation procedure using Le Cam
deficiency is provided.
Le Cam deficiency: For any two stochastic matrices W and
H , the Le Cam deficiency is
δ(W,H)
∆
= inf
R∈M
‖W −HR‖∞, (29)
where M denotes the set of all stochastic matrices. The
inf in (29) is achieved – this can be shown using Le Cam
randomization criterion [31]. Le Cam deficiency enables to
calculate the closest matrix that is Blackwell comparable.
Numerically, (29) can be solved as a convex optimization
problem using CVXOPT toolbox in Python or CVX in Matlab.
Solving (29) yields observation distributions that are Blackwell
comparable. This can be used to obtain Blackwell compara-
ble observation distributions for adaptive friendship polling
(Sec.III-C).
Consider a POMDP model θ = (P,O(u), C, ρ), where
O(u) for u = {1, 2, · · · , U} are observation matrices that
are not Blackwell comparable. Consider an approximation
γ = (P,O(1), Oˆ(uˆ), C, ρ), where uˆ = U/{1} and the
observations distributions are such that
O(1) B Oˆ(2) · · · B Oˆ(U). (30)
Algorithm 1 details a procedure to compute observations
distributions that share a Blackwell dominance relation as
in (30).
B. Performance Bounds on Comparison of Polling POMDPs
Let θ = (P,O(u), C, ρ) denote the given adaptive polling
POMDP model and γ = (P, Oˆ(u), C, ρ) denote the adaptive
polling POMDP model having a Blackwell dominance relation
between the observation distributions. Let Jµ∗(γ)(pi; θ) and
Jµ∗(γ)(pi; γ) be defined as in (15), and denote the cumula-
tive costs incurred by the two models θ and γ respectively,
when using the polling policy µ∗(γ). Let Jµ∗(θ)(pi; θ) and
Jµ∗(θ)(pi; γ) be defined as in (15), and denote the cumulative
costs incurred by the two models θ and γ respectively, when
using the polling policy µ∗(θ). Theorem 7 below provides
a bound on the deviations from the optimal cost and policy
performance of the adaptive polling POMDP models.
Theorem 7. Consider two adaptive polling POMDP models
θ = (P,O(u)) and γ = (P, Oˆ(u)) with identical costs and
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discount factor (C, ρ). Then for the mis-specified model and
mis-specified policy, the following sensitivity bounds hold:
Mis-specified Model: sup
pi∈Π
|Jµ∗(γ)(pi; γ)− Jµ∗(γ)(pi; θ)| ≤ G‖γ − θ‖.
(31)
Mis-specified Policy: Jµ∗(γ)(pi; θ) ≤ Jµ∗(θ)(pi; θ) + 2G‖γ − θ‖.
(32)
Here G = maxi∈X ,u
C(ei,u)
1−ρ and ei denotes the indicator
vector with a ‘1’ in the ith position, and
‖γ − θ‖ = max
u
max
i
∑
y
∑
j
Pij |Ojy(u)− Oˆjy(u)|.
Discussion: Theorem 7 provides uniform bounds on the ad-
ditional cost incurred for using parameters that are Blackwell
comparable in place of the given parameters of the adaptive
polling POMDP. The proof follows from arguments similar
to Theorem 14.9.1 in [5], and is omitted. Algorithm 1 and
Theorem 7 can be used to design polling POMDPs that have
observation distributions that are not Blackwell comparable,
for example, when the polling distributions in case of adaptive
intent polling are not Hurwitz; in case of adaptive friendship
polling; to name a few.
Proposition 4 below highlights the usefulness of Theorem 7 in
designing polling POMDPs that provide a choice between two
polling mechanisms in Sec.III. Let the opinion distribution B
(defined in (7)) be ultrametric and f2(z) ∈ PN be any polyno-
mial. Let the true POMDP model be θ = (P,O(1), O(2), C)
and the approximation be γ = (P,O(1), Oˆ(2), C). Let µ(·; γ)
denote the policy parameterized by the approximate model γ.
Proposition 4 (Adaptive Expectation v/s Intent). Let O(1) =
B
l1/N+1
N+1 , and O(2) = Bf2(B) for some l1 and f2, denote
the observation distributions in case of adaptive expectation
polling and adaptive intent polling respectively.
(i) The approximate Blackwell ordering using Algorithm 1 is
O(1) B Oˆ(2).
(ii) The myopic polling policy µ¯(pi; γ) is an upper bound to
the optimal polling policy µ∗(pi; γ), i.e, µ∗(pi; γ) ≤ µ¯(pi; γ)
for all pi ∈ Π.
Discussion: For u = 1, the pollster chooses expectation
polling and hence listens to an ultrametric channel, and for
u = 2, the pollster chooses intent polling and hence listens to
a polynomial channel. As O(2) = Bf2(B), we have B B
O(2). Note that since O(1) = B
l1/N+1
N+1 , when l1 = 1 (nodes
at Level N are polled to provide opinion of nodes at Level 0),
O(1) = B
1/N+1
N+1 = B B O(2). This implies that expectation
polling is more informative than intent polling.
For l1 > 1, there is no apparent comparison of ultrametric and
polynomial channels. However, Algorithm 1 can be used to
design polling POMDPs for arbitrary l1 and f2. Proposition 4
and hence Theorem 7 provides the performance bounds for
the pollster to choose between the two polling mechanisms.
C. Ordering of Hierarchical Social Networks
So far we have discussed three types of polling mechanisms
on a single hierarchical social network. In this section, we
briefly discuss how to order hierarchical networks that differ
in the opinion distributions B (defined in (9)), according to
the expected polling cost. Theorem 8 below shows that some
networks are inherently more expensive to poll than others; it
defines a partial order over networks that results in an ordering
of the cost of polling.
Let the POMDP model of the hierarchical network Hi
for i = 1, 2, · · · be θi, where the tuple θi = (P,O(i), C).
Let µ∗i (pi; θi) denote the optimal polling policy on each of
the network, and let Jµ∗
i
(θi)(pi; θi) denote the corresponding
optimal cumulative cost.
Theorem 8 (Ordinal sensitivity in Polling). Consider two
hierarchical networks H1 and H2. Let the adaptive polling
POMDPs for each hierarchical network have the observation
distributions that satisfy O(1) B O
(2). Then
Jµ∗1(θ1)(pi; θ1) ≤ Jµ∗2(θ2)(pi; θ2). (33)
Here O(1) B O(2) denotes O(1)(u) B O(2)(u) ∀ u ∈ U .
Discussion: The proof of Theorem 8 follows from argu-
ments similar to Theorem 14.8.1 in [5], and is omitted. Since
the observation likelihood for the pollster (O(i) ∀i) depends
on the opinion distribution (10), Theorem 8 provides a way
to compare the cumulative costs of hierarchical networks
with different opinion distributions. The result is useful, in
that, a hierarchical network that has more informative opinion
distribution at every level compared to another hierarchical
network is cheaper to poll on average as the nodes provide
more informative opinions.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The main results of this paper involve using Blackwell
dominance to construct myopic policies that provably upper
bound the optimal adaptive polling policy. In this section, the
performance of this myopic upper bound is illustrated using
numerical examples for adaptive polling. Let Πs1 represent
the set of belief states for which C(pi, 1) < C(pi, u) ∀u =
2, · · · , U . So on the set Πs1, the myopic policy coincides with
the optimal policy µ∗(pi). What is the performance loss outside
the set Πs1? Let Jµ¯(pi0) denote the discounted costs associated
with µ¯(pi0). We consider the following two measures for
measuring the effectiveness of the myopic polling policy:
(i) The percentage loss in optimality due to using the myopic
policy µ¯ instead of optimal policy µ∗ is
L1 =
Jµ¯(pi0)− Jµ∗(pi0)
Jµ∗(pi0)
. (34)
In (34), the total average cost is evaluated using 1000 Monte
carlo simulations over a horizon of 100 time units. The optimal
cost Jµ∗(pi0) is calculated as in (16). Here µ
∗ is the optimal
policy of the non-standard (non-linear cost) POMDP, and
is solved by brute force16 using discretization of the belief
simplex. The discretization is carried out using Freudenthal
16Software packages available for solving POMDPs require a
linear cost. See http://bigbird.comp.nus.edu.sg/pmwiki/farm/appl/ and
http://www.pomdp.org/
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triangulation; see [32].
(ii) Define the following discounted cost
J˜µ∗(pi0) = E
{
∞∑
k=1
ρk−1C˜ (pik, µ
∗(pik))
}
, where,
C˜ (pi, µ∗(pi)) =
{
C (pi, 1) pi ∈ Πs1
C(pi, U) + w1η2(pi, 1) pi 6∈ Πs1
Clearly an upper bound for the percentage loss in optimality
due to using the myopic policy µ¯ instead of optimal policy µ∗
is
L2 =
Jµ¯(pi0)− J˜µ∗(pi0)
J˜µ∗(pi0)
. (35)
In (35), the cumulative discounted cost is evaluated using 1000
Monte carlo simulations over a horizon of 100 time units.
A. Example 1: Market Research. Adaptive Expectation Polling
with X=3, Y=3, U = 2 and N=1
We describe how to estimate the revenue level a movie
generates based on the response received on social media
platform YouTube. The popularity in the movie is modeled
as a 3 state Markov chain x taking values on the state-space
X = {High,Medium,Low}. Prior to a movie’s release, the
production and the media house (proprietor) associated with
the movie release a variety of promotional material, in the
form of trailer videos, digital billboards, blogs, pre-screenings
etc., to advertise the movie. Also, the critics and those who
see the movie before its release will influence the future
movie goers by sharing opinions on social media platforms.
So production, media house, and critics are in Level 0 and
the common movie goer is Level 1. We will use adaptive
expectation polling (Sec.III-B) to poll the common movie
goer to estimate the performance of a movie, who provide
their opinion on YouTube and Twitter. The pollster asks the
following question:
“what does a node at Level 1 think the nodes at
Level 0 (u=1) and Level 1 (u=2) would report the state as?”
In other words, the pollster asks “what do you think?" and
“what do they think?". So the polling action u ∈ {1, 2} selects
the opinion distributions B
u/2
2 . In the example, we estimate
O and O1/2 (see Appendix B).
The elements of the transition probability matrix P and
the opinion probability matrix B2 were estimated from the
real-data as follows. First, a sample of 30 recent comedy
movies were selected. Depending on their box-office revenues,
each of these movies were assigned a state from the state-
space X = {High,Medium,Low}. For each of these movies,
YouTube comments on their trailers that expressed personal
opinions were collected using the Python YouTube API 17. The
sentiment associated with each of the comments was identified
using the python library - textblob18. A matrix consisting of
number of positive, neutral and negative comments for state
17https://gdata-python-client.googlecode.com/hg/pydocs/gdata.youtube.html
18http://textblob.readthedocs.org/en/dev/
of each movie {Good,Neutral,Bad} was formed. Using this
matrix, the opinion matrix B2, given in (36) was then obtained
by using maximum likelihood estimation algorithm with19
ultrametric constraints. This can be used to obtain the opinion
distribution B1 of Level 0. The computed parameters for P ,
O(1) = O1/2(2), and O(2) are as follows:
0.9089 0.0281 0.06300.0346 0.9433 0.0221
0.0065 0.0138 0.9797

 ,

0.6382 0.1809 0.18090.1809 0.6382 0.1809
0.1809 0.1809 0.6382

 ,

0.4728 0.2636 0.26360.2636 0.4728 0.2636
0.2636 0.2636 0.4728

 .
(36)
For a new (test) movie, depending on which level the obser-
vation is obtained from, the pollster updates the probability
distribution over the states using the state transition matrix P
and the corresponding estimated opinion distribution matrix
O(1) or O(2).
The costs associated with actions u = 1, 2 are chosen as
follows:
S(1) = 0.5, S(2) = 0.25, w1 = 0.5, w2 = 1. (37)
Note that the costs associated with the actions u = 1 and
u = 2 in (37) assume the following structure: w1 ≤ w2
model the accuracy of the observations and S(1) ≥ S(2)
model the additional cost in expectation polling – nodes need
to be compensated for exhausting their resources gathering
information from different levels. The probabilities in (36)
and the costs in (37) constitute the POMDP parameters of
the example discussed in this section. The performance of the
myopic policy µ¯(pi) is now evaluated for this POMDP. The
percentage loss in optimality L1, given in (34), is evaluated by
simulation for different values of the discount factor ρ in Fig.2.
B. Example 2: Large Dimensional Example. Adaptive Intent
Polling with X=20, Y=20, U = 5 and N = 9
The Blackwell dominance structural result is particularly
useful for large number of states and observation symbols
since solving the POMDP (for the optimal policy) is in-
tractable. Random20 stochastic matrices of size 20× 20 were
generated for the transition probability matrix P and the
observation probability matrix B. We know that Bl for l =
2, · · · , 10 constitute the opinion distribution of level l. The ob-
servation distribution of the pollster O(u) =
∑N
l=0 β
(u)
l B
l+1,
γ1 = [5, 4, 3, 2, 1] and γ2 = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Here the probability
distributions are chosen as21 and β(u) for u = {4, 3, 2, 1}
are obtained by successively removing the smallest root. The
(average) percentage loss in optimality L2 calculated using
(35) is shown in the in Fig.2. The percentage loss in Fig.2
is calculated as the average of L2 over 10 pairs of random
20× 20 stochastic matrices for P and B.
19See Appendix B
20The matrices are generated by stochastic simulation as follows: twenty
(1 × 20) probability vectors were simulated from the Dirichlet distribution
on a 19 dimensional unit simplex and stacked as rows.
21β(5) = [25/1296, 1555/15552, 3461/15552, 86925/311040, 13627/62208,
11617/103680, 437/11520, 2671/311040, 73/62208, 29/311040, 1/311040].
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Fig. 2. The figure shows the percentage loss in optimality for different values
of the discount factor when using a myopic policy. Here L1 is defined in (34)
is used as performance loss measure for Example 1 and L2 is defined in (35)
is used as a performance loss measure for Example 2. Of course, when ρ = 0,
the optimal policy is a myopic policy. The percentage loss in Example 1 is
greater than that in Example 2, and this is because of the costs incurred by
the optimal policy in (34) and (35).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considered the problem of adaptive (feedback
control based) polling in hierarchical social networks, and
the problem was formulated as a partially observed Markov
decision process (POMDP). We presented three main results.
First, we presented an adaptive generalization of intent polling
to hierarchical social networks. The notion of Blackwell domi-
nance was extended to the case of polynomial observation like-
lihoods (channels) described by matrix polynomials. Second,
we presented an adaptive generalization of expectation polling
to hierarchical social networks. The notion of Blackwell
dominance was extended to the case of ultrametric observation
likelihoods (channels) described by fractional matrix powers.
Third, we presented an adaptive generalization of neighbor-
hood expectation polling to hierarchical social networks. The
notion of Blackwell dominance was extended to the case of
multinomial distributions of observation likelihoods.
This extension of Blackwell dominance to more general
channels that arise in hierarchical social networks was used to
provide a natural ordering of Rényi Divergence and Shannon
capacity. These information theoretic consequences provide a
ranking of these general channel structures in the order of their
ability to distinguish the states.
We also discussed approximate Blackwell dominance based
on Le Cam deficiency to facilitate the comparison of the
different polling mechanisms, and situations where a Black-
well dominance relation is absent. Performance bounds on the
cumulative cost and polling policy were provided when the
model parameters are mis-specified.
Finally, the results and the performance of the myopic polling
policy was illustrated on a dataset from YouTube.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 2:
Denote by y(u) as the observations recorded when using action
u. Then O(u + 1) = O(u)R implies the following
P
(
y(u+1)|x
)
=
∑
y(u)
P
(
y(u+1)|y(u)
)
P
(
y(u)|x
)
(38)
For notational convenience, let T (pi, y, u) be written as
T (pi, y(u) = y). Observe that,
T
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
)
=
Ou+1(y)P
′pi
σ
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
) =∑
r
Λ(r)T (pi, y(u) = r)
(39)
where Λ(r) is a probability mass function w.r.t r and defined
as
Λ(r) = P
(
y(u+1) = y|y(u) = r
) σ (pi, y(u) = r)
σ
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
) (40)
The following inequality follows from the concavity of V (pi)
and (40)
V
(
T
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
))
=V
(∑
r
Λ(r)T (pi, y(u) = r)
)
V
(
T
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
))
≥
∑
r
Λ(r)V
(
T (pi, y(u) = r)
)
(41)
Following completes the proof of Theorem 2 using (41).∑
y
σ(pi, y(u+1) = y)V
(
T
(
pi, y(u+1) = y
))
≥
∑
y
∑
r
Λ(r)V
(
T (pi, y(u) = r)
)
σ(pi, y(u+1) = y)
=
∑
r
V
(
T
(
pi, y(u) = r
))
σ
(
pi, y(u) = r
)
(42)
∴ C(pi, 1) ≤ C(pi, u) ∀u⇒ µ∗(pi) = 1⇒ µ∗(pi) ≤ µ¯(pi).
Proof of Theorem 3:
Let O(u) B O(u + 1) for u ∈ U . From the definition of
Rényi Divergence (19) we have [33]:
Dα(Oi(u+1)||Oj(u+1)) ≤ min
{
(1−α)D(Oi(u+1)||Oj(u+1)),
αD(Oj(u+ 1)||Oi(u+ 1))
}
. (43)
We know that [34]:
O(u) B O(u + 1)⇒
D(Oi(u)||Oj(u)) ≥ D(Oi(u+ 1)||Oj(u+ 1)), (44)
for all i, j ∈ X . From (43) and (44), the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1:
It is given that p(z) ∈ Pn and q(z) ∈ Pm, with n > m.
Clearly, f(Q) and g(Q) are stochastic matrices. Further, if
the quotient polynomial h(z) = f(z)g(z) ∈ P(n−m), then it is
easily seen that g(Q) B f(Q).
Since the polynomials p(z) and q(z) are Hurwitz, the quotient
polynomial h(z) = p(z)q(z) =
∑(n−m)
i=0 αiz
i has positive co-
efficients; i.e αi > 0. It suffices to prove that h(z) ∈ P(n−m).
It is clear that p(1) = q(1) = 1, which implies that h(1) = 1;
i.e,
∑(n−m)
i=0 αi = 1.
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Proof of Theorem 2:
We will only prove Theorem 2b and Theorem 2c.
For Theorem 2b, we have Q(j+J)/K = Qj/K × QJ/K .
Therefore Qj/K B Q(j+J)/K .
For Theorem 2c, we have Qj/K = Qj/K+1 × Qj/K(K+1).
Therefore Qj/K B Qj/K+1.
APPENDIX B
EM ALGORITHM WITH ULTRAMETRIC CONSTRAINTS
The parameters of the POMDP are computed using a
sequence of observations obtained from level N in Fig.1.
Specifically, a modified version of the EM algorithm [35]
is used to compute the maximum likelihood estimate of the
tuple (P,BN+1), where BN+1 is restricted to the space
of ultrametric stochastic matrices. The opinion probability
matrices at all other levels are computed by taking frac-
tional exponents of BN+1. In the modified EM algorithm,
computing BN+1 requires maximizing an auxiliary likelihood
function (of observation sequences) subject to ultrametric
constraints (see Footnote 13) on BN+1. However, the space
of ultrametric stochastic matrices is non-convex because of
constraint BN+1(i, j) ≥ min {BN+1(i, k), BN+1(k, j)} and
thus computationally intractable.
The following reformulation based on the Big-M method in
linear programming [36] is used to deal with the non-convex
constraint. For all i, j, k ∈ X , i 6= j 6= k:
BN+1(i, j) ≥ BN+1(i, k) +M(1− κ), (45)
BN+1(i, j) ≥ BN+1(k, j) +Mκ, (46)
BN+1(k, j) ≥ BN+1(i, k) +M(1− κ), (47)
BN+1(i, k) ≥ BN+1(k, j) +Mκ, (48)
κ ≥ 0, (49)
−κ ≥ −1, (50)
for some large positive value M . The resulting observation
likelihood BN+1 is a stochastic and ultrametric matrix.
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